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You’ll never walk alone again: The governance turn in professional sports 
Arnout Geeraert1 and Hans Bruyninckx2 
This chapter looks into the main dimensions of the governance concept and their relevance for 
professional sport. Firstly, we discuss the peculiarities of sports governance by using a 
broader governance angle. Subsequently, we narrow governance as a concept down to three 
categorisations that emerge from the existing literature: governance as networks, governance 
as steering and good governance. By applying those three concepts, several governance issues 
emerge, all rooted in the traditional governance system of the sports world, namely 
hierarchical self-governance. We then discuss how the European Union (EU) can contribute 
to solutions to those issues and, finally, we present a case where the EU indeed contributed to 
better governance in sports: the social dialogue in professional football. On a final note, it 
must be stressed that the focus of this contribution is on the organisation of professional 
sports, mostly – but not exclusively- at the international level. 
Introduction: the hierarchical self-governance of professional sports 
The concept of governance is increasingly used for a number of social, economic and political 
practices in several spheres of social life, including policy making, regulation, the setting of 
rules, norms and standards, or broader when it comes to the study of the exertion of 
authority.3 Thus, in the last few decades, a significant body of governance literature has 
emerged. This has led to some considerable theoretical and conceptual confusion and 
therefore, ‘governance’ is often used very loosely to refer to rather different conceptual 
meanings. Van Kersbergen and van Waarden4, for example, distinguish no less than nine 
different meanings regarding ‘governance’, which may lead to the conclusion that the term 
simply has ‘too many meanings to be useful’.5  
                                                          
1 HIVA - Research Institute for Work and Society; Institute for International and European Policy, KU Leuven, 
Leuven, Belgium. 
2 European Environment Agency, Copenhagen, Denmark. The views presented in this chapter are solely those of 
the author and may not be regarded as representing an official position from the European Environment Agency. 
3 Hans Bruyninckx: Sports governance: between the obsession with rules and regulation and the aversion to 
being ruled and regulated, in: Barbara Segaert, Marc Theeboom, Christianne Timmerman and Bart Vanreusel 
(eds.): Sports governance, development and corporate responsibility, Oxford, pp. 107-121. 
4 Kees Van Kersbergen and Frans Van Waarden: ‘Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines, in: European 
Journal of Political Research, 43 (2) (2004), pp. 143–171. 
5 Rod Rhodes: Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, 
Buckingham 1997, p. 15. 
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Definitions on governance depend largely on the respective research agendas of scholars or on 
the phenomenon that is being studied, but it is mostly used or understood as a substitute for, 
or, an addition to more traditional notions of government. In that regard, while ‘government’ 
usually refers to the formal and institutional top-down processes which mostly, but not 
exclusively, operate at the nation state level6, governance is widely regarded as ‘a more 
encompassing phenomenon’. 7  Indeed, in addition to state authorities, governance also 
subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms and thus allows non-state actors to be 
brought into the analysis of societal steering. 8  In addition, governance can also be 
differentiated from ‘governing’. According to Kooiman, the latter can be defined as those 
societal activities which make a ‘purposeful effort to guide, steer, control, or manage (sectors 
or facets of) societies’.9 Governance, then, is mainly concerned with describing ‘the patterns 
that emerge from the governing activities of social, political and administrative actors’. 10 
The traditional governance model of professional sports can be categorised as hierarchical 
self-governance as two main characteristics stand out: autonomy and hierarchy. The former 
may explain why, compared to other policy fields, the governance literature has paid little 
attention to sports.11 Whereas governance as a concept is usually applied in connection with 
states, government interference in the activities of sport governing bodies (SGBs), especially 
at the international level, is a relatively recent phenomenon.12 Indeed, international SGBs 
have traditionally known a large autonomy and in that sense, they were subject to almost 
complete self-governance. The very essence of the construction of modern sport is rooted in 
                                                          
6 Gerry Stoker: Governance as theory: five propositions, in: International Social Science Journal 50 (1) (1998), 
pp. 17–28. 
7 James Rosenau: Governance, order and change in world politics, in James Rosenau, Ernst-Otto Czempiel 
(eds.): Governance without Government, Cambridge 1992, p. 4. 
8 James Rosenau, 1992, p. 4; Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal: Environmental governance, in: Annual 
Review of Environmental Resources 31 (2006), p. 298. 
9 Jan Kooiman: Modern Governance: New government-society interactions, London, 1993, p. 3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Notable exceptions include Ian Henry and Ping Chao Lee:. Governance and ethics in sport, in: Simon 
Chadwick and John Beech (eds.): The business of sport management, Harlow 2004, pp. 25-42; Matthew Holt: 
UEFA, Governance and the control of club competition in European Football, London, 2006; Borja García: The 
European Union and the Governance of Football: A Game of Levels and Agendas (PhD Thesis), Loughborough, 
2008. Hans Bruyninckx, 2012; Arnout Geeraert, Jeroen Scheerder and Hans Bruyninckx: The governance 
network of European football: introducing new governance approaches to steer football at the EU level, in: 
International journal of sport policy and politics 5 (1) (2013), pp. 113-132. 
12 It must be noted that this does not apply for authoritarian regimes, in which sports are framed as an important 
element of nationalism, propaganda and international identity. However, the emphasis of this chapter is on sports 
governance in democratic and international contexts.  
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classic liberalism, notably in the freedom of association. 13  Accordingly, the two most 
influential and powerful international sports organisations, namely the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), were 
established respectively in 1894 and 1904 by a class of people who believed in the separation 
of sport and the state as a sacred principle.14 Thus, autonomy from political institutions is not 
only a deeply rooted, but also a cherished principle in the sports world. 
The other main characteristic of sports governance is hierarchy. The so-called ‘European 
model of sport’ is based on a system created in the last few decades of the 19th century by the 
Football Association (FA), the governing body of the game in England to this day.15 This 
model implies that Global Sport Governing Bodies (GSGBs) are the supreme governing 
bodies of sport since they stand at the apex of a vertical chain of command, running from 
international, over continental, to national and finally local organisations.16 That pyramidal 
set-up made sure that GSGBs had a governing monopoly over their respective sports at a 
global level, but it is very much centralised and even undemocratic since those at the very 
bottom, i.e. athletes who wish to take part in the competitions of the system, are automatically 
subject to the rules and regulations of the governing bodies, often without being able to 
influence them to their benefit.  
This traditional system of hierarchical self-governance, which existed for almost an entire 
century, increasingly came under pressure and this has raised many issues with regard to 
sports governance. In the next section, we wield a theory-of-governance based approach in 
order to frame those issues. Thus, the aim is to demonstrate why functioning governance 
practices are difficult to achieve in the sports world. Subsequently, we discuss how the 
European Union may contribute to solutions to the raised issues and finally, we present the 
case of the social dialogue in professional football in order to substantiate our claims.   
                                                          
13 Stephan Szymanski: A theory on the evolution of modern sport, in: International association of sports 
economists Working Paper Series Paper No. 06-30 (2006). 
14 Alan Tomlinson: FIFA and the men who made it, in: Soccer & Society 1 (1) (2000), pp. 55-71; Jean-Loup 
Chappelet: L’autonomie du sport en Europe, Strasbourg, 2000.  
15 European Commission: The European Model of Sport. Consultation paper of DGX, 1998; Sthephan 
Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist: National Pastime, Washington, 2005. 
16 Osvaldo Croci John and Forster: Webs of Authority: Hierarchies, Networks, Legitimacy, and Economic Power 
in Global Sport Organisations, in: Gregory Papanikos (ed.): The economics and management of mega athletic 
events: Olympic Games, professional sports, and other essays, Athens 2004, pp. 3-10. Other key elements of the 
European model of sport include the connection between grassroots and professional sport, the system of 
promotion and relegation and the national organisation of sport and its competitive structures, see European 
Commission, 1998. 
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Governance concepts and their relevance for sport 
Building upon previous work17, in what follows, we frame the above-mentioned governance 
issues under three categorisations of the governance concept, drawn from the existing 
literature: governance as networks, governance as steering and good governance. Those 
dimensions help to explain certain realities in the sports world. Governance as networks is an 
analytical tool that is helpful to explain the current shifts and map the actors in sports 
governance. Governance as steering views governance as the designated strategy when 
hierarchical rule is appropriate and is thus very relevant in the relation between political 
entities and international SGBs. Finally, good governance is a normative device by which we 
can assess the decency of governance processes. In the light of the many ‘failures of 
governance’18 in the sports world, this governance dimension becomes extremely relevant. 
Governance networks 
The classical view of a direct and almost exclusive connection between the state and the 
governing of society is less and less consistent with reality.19 Today, political systems and 
activities are no longer exclusively connected to – or even the prerogative of - states. 
According to many policy analysts, the public sector has seen this erosion of government in 
order to deal with today’s multi-layered society.20 Hence, government policies have evolved 
from a centralist, top-down model (labelled ‘government’) to a ‘governance’ model, which 
implies partnership, cooperation and collaboration are gradually replacing hierarchical 
authority.21 As such, society is increasingly being governed by interplay between state, market 
and civil society. Similar forms of governance also emerge at the international level. In order 
to compensate for the loss of governance capabilities of nation-states and to fill gaps in global 
                                                          
17 David Hindley: Governance and sport. Available at: http://www.hlst.ltsn.ac.uk/resources/governance.html; 
Hans Bruyninckx, 2012. 
18 Ian Henry and Ping Chao Lee, 2004. 
19 Hans Bruyninckx and Jeroen Scheerder: Sport, macht en internationale politiek. Een politicologisch kader. 
[Sport, power and international politics. A political framework], in: Jeroen Scheerder and Bert Meulders (eds.): 
Wedijver in een internationale arena. Sport, bestuur en macht [Competition in an international arena. Sport, 
governance and power], Ghent 2007, pp. 1-19. 
20 Renate Mayntz: Modernization and the Logic of Inter-organisational Networks, Working Paper, Max-Planck 
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 1991, pp. 1–22; Walter Kickert: Complexity, Governance and Dynamics: 
Conceptual Explorations of Network Management, in: Jan Kooiman (ed.): Modern Governance, New 
Government-society Interactions, London 1993, pp. 191-204: Rod Rhodes: The New Governance: governing 
without government, in: Political Studies 44 (4) (1996), pp. 652-667. 
21 Nikolas Rose: Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies, in: Andrew Barry and Nikolas Rose (eds.): Foucault 
and political reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government, Chicago 1996, pp. 37-64. 
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regulation of global public goods, new forms of global governance are emerging.22 The term 
‘governance network’ is used to describe public policy making and implementation through a 
web of relationships between state, market and civil society actors. 23  Thus, the policy 
produced by these networks is a result of negotiations and bargaining between the involved 
actors rather than a result of authoritative decision-making by a single actor and hence, the 
networked process of rule and norm setting becomes the focal point in the governance as 
networks approach.  
SGBs have been subject to a similar erosion of their hierarchical powers. The hierarchical 
sports system proved to be a tremendous source for conflict since it encouraged those at the 
bottom of the chain of command, dissatisfied with their lack of involvement in the policy 
processes, to find recourse before national and European courts. 24  Together with the 
enormous commercialisation of sport, this resulted in the emancipation of SGBs’ internal 
stakeholders.25 In addition to sport’s internal stakeholders, certain civil society and especially 
market actors have also been successful in exerting pressure on SGBs in order to have their 
interest met.26 Finally, a certain ‘governmentalisation of sport’27 took place, which implies 
that GSGBs no longer have a monopoly over the governing of their sport since ‘public 
authorities are contesting, competing, and cooperating with GSGBs for the regulation of 
sport’.28 Indeed, ‘failures of governance’ in sport have prompted the debate for more public 
oversight and control over the world of sports. Moreover, public authorities, realising the 
potential of sport for the accomplishment of non-sports related cross sectoral policy goals, 
have increasingly developed a state apparatus for the delivery and management of sport.29 In 
addition, due to the increased commercial and economic significance of sports, activities of 
                                                          
22 The term ‘global governance’’ can  be defined as ‘the activity of governing relations that transcend national 
frontiers without having sovereign authority’ Lawrence Finkelstein: What Is Global Governance?, in: Global 
Governance 1 (3) (1995), p. 368. 
23 Erik-Hans Klijn: Governance and governance networks in Europe, in: Public Management Review 10 (4) 
(2008), pp. 505-525. 
24 Alan Tomlinson: Tuck up tight lads: Structures of control within football culture, in: Alan  
Tomlinson (Ed.): Explorations in football culture, Eastbourne 1983, pp. 165-186; Richard Parrish and Dave 
McArdle: Beyond Bosman: The European Union's influence upon professional athletes' freedom of movement, 
in: Sport in Society 7 (3) (2004), pp. 403-418. 
25 Lucie Thibault, Lisa Kihl and Kathy Babiak: Democratisation and governance in international sport: 
addressing issues with athlete involvement in organisational policy, in: International journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, 2 (3) (2010), pp. 275-302; Arnout Geeraert, Jeroen Scheerder and Hans Bruyninckx, 2013. 
26 John Sugden: Network football, in: John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson (eds): Power games, London 2002, pp. 
61–80; Ian Henry and Ping Chao Lee, 2004. 
27 Nils Asle Bergsgard, Barrie Houlihan, Per Mangset, Svein Ingve Nodland and Hilmar Rommetvedt: Sport 
policy: a comparative analysis of stability and change, Oxford, 2007, p. 46. 
28 Osvaldo Croci and John Forster, 2004.  
29 Nils Asle Bergsgard et al., 2007, p. 47. 
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SGBs have been captured by economic laws and policies at different levels. 30  Whereas 
governance literature, as has been discussed, speaks of a retreat of the state from the 
governance of society, an opposite evolution is thus playing in sports.31 However, when we 
regard SGBs as the main regulatory bodies of the sports world, their erosion, or rather 
delegation, of power mirrors recent evolutions in societal governance quite perfectly. Indeed, 
in an increasingly complex sports world, crowded with powerful stakeholders, the hierarchical 
authority of SGBs is eroding and is giving way to networked forms of governance such as 
partnership, cooperation and collaboration. 
As a consequence of those trends, SGBs can no longer be regarded as the sole devisers and 
definers of policy in professional sports. Indeed, from an analytical point of view, the system 
of hierarchic self-governance is increasingly crumbling and giving way to a more networked 
governance, in which different stakeholders exert power in different ways and in different 
contexts in a complex web of interrelationships. In order to achieve significant policy change, 
actors in such networks must negotiate and bargain with each other and SGBs increasingly 
lose their ability to rule in a top-down manner.32 Indeed, they can no longer simply impose 
their will on passive stakeholders but need to negotiate with relevant powerful organisations 
with an interest in their policies. 
True, SGBs have been very reluctant to accept interventions from state authorities in their 
activities and it is generally acknowledged that they adhere to a strong protectionist vision of 
sports governance.33 However, driven by pragmatism, they are willing to engage in networked 
governance arrangements with political institutions. For instance, SGBs can get a certain 
degree of legitimacy by associating themselves with public authorities at the international or 
European level.34 Another reason is lobbying. For instance, SGBs are currently more open to 
EU institutions in order to mitigate the impact of EU law on their activities or to proactively 
                                                          
30 Richard Parrish: Sports law and policy in the European Union, Manchester, 2003. 
31 Hans Bruyninckx and Jeroen Scheerder, 2009. 
32 Ian Henry and Pich Chao Lee, 2004. 
33 Richard Parrish: Social Dialogue in European Professional Football, in: European Law Journal 17 (2) (2011), 
pp. 215–216. 
34 Osvaldo Croci and John Forster: Sport and Politics: The Question of Legitimacy of International Sport 
Organisations, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country 
Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, 2006; Borja García: From regulation to governance and 
representation: agenda-setting and the EU’s involvement in sport, in: Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 5 
(1) (2007a); Hans Bruyninckx, 2012. 
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influence sports policy.35 Yet, there is also a growing awareness that they cannot manage 
certain governance issues in an increasingly complex sporting reality unilaterally. In that 
regard, the erosion of the hierarchic self-governance of the sporting world increasingly is its 
own choice, although that choice may predominantly be motivated by external pressures for 
more effective governance in high-profile issues such as match-fixing and doping. 
On that note, SGBs do not seem capable of protecting their sports from the more avaricious 
and predatory ways of global capitalism in a unilateral way. Indeed, with the increased 
commercial and economic significance of sport in the past three decades, sport is more and 
more the target of, and integrated with, transnational business interests. In this constellation, 
we have seen the rise of transnational criminal networks involved in human trafficking, 
match-fixing, doping, etc.. In the vein of recent shifts in societal governance, that may in fact 
call for other, more effective horizontal forms of governance since the traditional governing 
method of the sports world through vertical chains of command, which originates from a time 
when sport was exclusively an amateur activity, is not effective in an increasingly complex 
sports world that is crowded with different powerful stakeholders.36 
The rise of networked governance in sports also poses issues in terms of democratic 
legitimacy. Indeed, democratic problems in terms of lack of accountability and the privileging 
of strong and resourceful elites is an ever present danger in governance networks.37 With 
regard to the latter, the danger exists that the most powerful stakeholders are favoured by 
SGBs to the detriment of those that have less clout, but are nevertheless equally affected by 
the policies devised in the sport governance network. 
Governance as steering 
The notion of governance as steering recognises that the responsibility of state authorities is 
changing. Since governance networks are defined in term of their capacity for self-regulation, 
                                                          
35 Matthew Holt, 2006; Borja García: UEFA and the European Union: from confrontation to cooperation, in:  
Journal of contemporary European research 3 (3) (2007b), pp. 202-223. 
36 Arnout Geeraert, Jeroen Scheerder and Hans Bruyninckx, 2013.  
37 Chris Skelcher: Does Democracy Matter? A Transatlantic Research Design on Democratic Performance and 
Special Purpose Governments, in: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17 (1) (2007), pp. 61-
76; Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing: Making governance networks effective and democratic through 
metagovernance, in: Public administration 87 (2) (2009), pp. 234–258. Hence, a second generation body of 
governance network literature is focusing on the democratic performance of governance networks. 
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they cannot be controlled through the exercise of sovereign power. 38  Hence, governance 
network literature has redefined the notion of political control in terms of ‘meta-governance’. 
Meta-governance holds that the most appropriate way of controlling governance networks is 
by ‘steering’. That means that, via a series of more or less subtle and indirect forms of 
governance, politicians should seek to shape the free actions of the network actors in 
accordance with a number of pre-defined general procedural standards and substantial goals. 
Thus, the conditions for interaction of relatively free and self-responsible actors within 
governance networks are structured in order to ensure conformity with some generally 
defined objectives. 39  Governments thus increasingly facilitate and coordinate rather than 
managing society hierarchically through direct control – ‘steering’ instead of ‘rowing’. The 
effectiveness of steering is ensured when governance networks operate ‘in the shadow of 
hierarchy’. 40  The latter is the case when the attempts of public authorities to steer are 
ultimately backed by the threat of replacing the governance network with hierarchical rule.  
It is certainly true that SGBs have steered, rather than being steered, and this complicates 
attempts by public authorities to exercise some form of control over them. In addition, there is 
no ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast over networked arrangements between SGBs operating at the 
international level and political institutions since attempts of public authorities to steer SGBs 
are not ultimately backed by the threat of replacing the governance network with hierarchical 
rule. Indeed, hierarchical rule over SGBs operating at the international level is virtually 
impossible. As such, like many multinational corporations operating on a global playing field, 
they are able to choose the optimal regulatory context for their operations and thus pick a 
favourable environment as the home base for their international activities.41 For most SGBs, 
including the largest organisations, this is Switzerland, where they are embedded into a legal 
system that gives them enormous protection against internal and external examination. 42 
                                                          
38 Renate Mayntz, 1991, p. 10; Jan Kooiman, 1993: Bob Jessop: The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge, 
2002. 
39 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing: The democratic anchorage of governance networks, in: Scandinavian 
political studies, 28 (3) (2005a), p. 202. 
40 Fritz Scharpf: Games real actors could play: Positive and negative coordination in embedded negotiations, 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994), pp. 27–53. However, if the actual attempts at regulating a self-regulating 
network become too tight, the network will cease to be a network, instead becoming reduced to an order-taking 
bureaucracy. Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing: Network governance and post-liberal democracy, in: 
Administrative theory and praxis, 27 (2) (2005b), p. 204.   
41 Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo: The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World: A 
Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy, in: Journal 
of Management Studies 48 (4) (2011), pp. 899–931. 
42 Arnout Geeraert, Jens Alm and Michael Groll: Good governance in international sport organisations: an 
analysis of the 35 Olympic sport governing bodies, in: International journal for sport policy and politics, 
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Moreover, powerful international sports organisations have important means of reprisal at 
their disposal.43  Indeed, they can withhold recalcitrant countries entrance to international 
football or withdraw their hosting of an important event.44 In addition, acting contrary to their 
preferences may be detrimental for bids to host major events.45 Moreover, organised sport is 
very popular with national politicians, who use it to win votes and often even become fans for 
political reasons. In the same vein, national sports federations often have strong ties with their 
national government, which international SGBs can utilise.46 All those issues complicate or 
even preclude public authorities from assuming a steering role over international SGBs. 
Good governance 
A third notion refers to good governance, a term which is normative in essence. Although 
there exists no single definition on good governance, it is often used as a sort of normative 
benchmark to judge governance practices. Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War, a 
‘chorus of voices’ has been urging governments ‘to heed higher standards of democratic 
representation, accountability and transparency’.47 In the corporate world, good governance 
exists for a much longer time, although it is usually referred to as ‘corporate governance’. In 
general, this relates to the various ways in which private or public held companies are 
governed in ways which are accountable to their internal and external stakeholders. 48 
International institutions have issued checklists of factors that serve as a yardstick for good 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
forthcoming, accepted for publication. Although the choice for Switzerland could initially be explained through 
‘pioneer mover-follower’ and/or ‘dominant mover-follower’ models (see Osvaldo Croci and John Forster, 2004, 
p. 9), Switzerland’s rather broad interpretation of the freedom of association while it is not subject to 
harmonising EU law probably is the main reason for SGBs to keep it as the home base for their activities. 
43 Paul Demaret: Introduction - Quelques observations sur la signification de l'arrêt ‘Bosman’, in: Revue du 
marché unique européen 1 (1996), p. 15. 
44 For instance, FIFA was able to force Greece, Spain and Poland to abandon arguably legitimate interference in 
football matters, for instance by threatening to withhold these countries entrance to international football. In the 
case of Poland, FIFA received support from UEFA, who threatened to withdraw Poland from hosting the 2012 
EURO, which would have caused an economic and political catastrophe. See Borja García and Henk Erik Meier: 
Keeping private governance private: Is FIFA blackmailing national governments?, Paper presented in the 13th 
EUSA Biennial Conference, Baltimore (Maryland, USA), 9-11 May 2013; Marek Kędzior and Melchior 
Szczepanik: Poland: new shape, old problems, in: Arne Niemann, Borja García and Wynn Grant (eds.): The 
transformation of European football: towards the Europeanisation of the national game, Manchester 2011, 204-
219. 
45 Borja García and Stephen Weatherill: Engaging with the EU in order to minimize its impact: sport and the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon, in: Journal of European public policy 19 (2) (2012), p. 249. 
46 Nicola Porro and Pippo Russo: Berlusconi and other matters: the era of ‘football-politics’, in: Journal of 
modern Italian studies, 5 (3) (2001), pp. 348-371; Borja García, 2008, pp. 120-121; Arne Niemann and 
Alexander Brand: The impact of European integration on domestic sport: the case of 
German football, in: Sport in society: cultures, commerce, media, politics 11 (1) (2008), pp. 98; Borja García and 
Stephen Weatherill, 2012, p. 242. 
47 Ngaire Woods: Good governance in international organisations, in: Global Governance, 5 (1) (1999), p. 39. 
48 OECD: Principles of corporate governance 2004, Paris, 2004, p. 11. 
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governance and are oriented towards core features of governance structures and processes that 
are especially to be found in OECD countries.49  They comprise factors that include key 
principles such as accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, predictability, sound financial 
management, fighting corruption and transparency. In addition, when they refer to the 
political area, they may also include participation and democratisation, since a democratic 
environment is seen as a key background variable for good governance.  
Since most GSGBs are subject to a laissez-faire regime in their host country, outside of the 
scope of harmonising EU law, in general, they are not subject to mandatory basic 
organisational requirements connected to good governance. That far-stretching autonomy 
seems to have had a negative impact on the quality of the self-governance of these 
organisations. Indeed, a long list of rule or norm transgressions and ethical scandals in the 
sports world has accumulated in the last few decades and they seem to coalesce in their most 
visible and blatant form at the highest level of sports governance. These abuses are for a large 
part institutionally induced, since they have their origin in the organisational structures of 
GSGBs, which do not meet up to acceptable standards of good governance that exist for 
comparable organisations from the public or private sphere.50 Most notably, GSGBs have a 
lack of internal accountability arrangements and with regard to checks and balances, arguably 
the most topical issue is the total lack of independent ethics committees. In sum, these 
accountability deficits constitute a breeding ground for corruption and the lack of democracy 
and effectiveness.  
Notwithstanding recent internal and external efforts, the impression is that there still is inertia 
towards the achievement of better governance in the sports world. 51  In fact, the lack of 
accountability arrangements in GSGBs impedes the impetus for change towards better 
governance, since senior officials are not obliged to reflect on their current conduct.52 But 
even when there is a willingness to improve their governance, a homogeneous set of core 
principles for good governance in GSGBs is still missing, despite efforts by a multitude of 
                                                          
49 Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Kenneth Mease: Making Sense of Governance. Empirical Evidence from 
Sixteen Developing Countries, London, 2004. 
50 Arnout Geeraert, Jens Alm and Michael Groll, forthcoming. 
51 Sunder Katwala: Democratising global sport, London, 2000. Play the Game: Cologne Consensus: towards a 
global code for governance in sport. End statement of the Play the Game 2011 conference, Cologne, 6 
October 2011. 
52 Arnout Geeraert, Jens Alm and Michael Groll, forthcoming. 
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actors at different levels, and due to the peculiar structures of these organisations, codes from 
other sectors cannot be used as such.  
The added value of European Union involvement in professional sports 
The European Union and professional sport 
At the European level, the much discussed Bosman ruling by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) from 1995 resulted in a definitive –but forced- EU involvement in 
professional sports.53 However, since the EU does not have a strong competence in sports, it 
has been struggling to find the right balance between allowing total autonomy and 
establishing an extensive framework for government intervention ever since. Currently, it is 
generally assumed that the EU offers sports bodies a degree of ‘supervised autonomy’: they 
can exercise their autonomy as long as they are respectful of European law and demonstrate a 
clear commitment to transparency, democracy and protection of the values of sport.54 Still, the 
impression is that thus far, the European Commission has been rather reactive in its approach 
towards professional sports.55 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, article 
165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grants the EU an express 
- but complementary and thus very limited- role in the field of sport. This provides the EU 
institutions with new possibilities with regard to sports and a series of initiatives have indeed 
since been launched. While it is not the intention of this section to investigate the possibilities 
of article 165 TFEU, nor to zoom in on the EU sports policy as such, we try to demonstrate 
the added value of EU involvement through steering in professional sports using governance 
concepts. In particular, we use the governance as networks approach to demonstrate how the 
inclusion of the EU may lead to a more effective sports governance. In addition, we show the 
potential and benefits of steering by the EU in professional sports, in particular with regard to 
democratic control and good governance. 
  
Democratic control, the involvement of elected politicians and a more effective governance  
                                                          
53 Borja García, 2007a. 
54 Ken Foster: Can sport be regulated by Europe? An analysis of alternative models, in: Andrew Caiger and 
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pp. 43-64. 
55 Osvaldo Croci: Taking the Field: The EU and Sport Governance, in: Ingeborg Tommel and Amy Verdun 
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In this section, we take a look at the added value of EU involvement in professional sports. 
We postulate that the EU can put democratic control on SGBs; that (indirect) involvement of 
democratically elected politicians from the Council and the European Parliament in sports 
governance holds potential benefits since they are a resourceful, collectively oriented and 
democratically committed group; and, that the EU can contribute to a more effective 
governance of a complex environment due to its expertise and competence. 
 
At the international level, a regulatory vacuum exists in which powerful transnational actors 
often have powers that dwarf those of many governments.56 Hence, the general worry with 
regard to globalization is that, in a globalized world, powerful actors are not accountable.57 
Obviously, this goes for multinational companies, but the argument also applies to SGBs. The 
fact that there is no state actor holding these private organisations accountable is not without 
danger to the decency of their internal functioning since, in the absence of a ‘whip in the 
window’, the expectation is that the reliability of voluntary self-commitments suffers. 58 
Indeed, it is assumed that the potential threat that stricter regulations will be enacted unless 
the potentially affected actors adapt their behaviour to the expectations of the legislator, 
pushes those organisations which operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ towards compliance. 
According to Wolf, ‘even the most prominent functional equivalents to the checks and 
balances institutionalised within the political systems of democratic states (…) cannot be 
provided by private actors alone’.59 Hirst even goes so far as to suggest that hierarchical 
organisations which are not subject to democratic control cannot be expected to have internal 
practices conductive to democratic manners.60 The EU seems to be the only actor capable of 
establishing some kind of democratic control on SGBs. Although it does not have a strong 
sporting competence, in principle it does possess the ability to intervene much stronger in the 
sports sector on the basis of its internal market powers. While that is currently not at all 
politically desirable, such form of latent pressure is ever present in sport matters and 
international sport organisations have been willing to engage with the EU institutions 
                                                          
56 Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, 2011, p. 900. 
57 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens: The Globalization of World Politics. Fourth edition, Oxord, 
2011, p. 11. 
58 Fritz Scharpf, 1994. 
59 Klaus Dieter Wolf: Emerging patterns of global governance: the new interplay between the state, business and 
civil society, in Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo (eds): Handbook of research on global corporate 
citizenship, Cheltenham 2008, p. 244. 
 
60 Paul Hirst: Democracy and Governance, in: John Pierre (ed): Debating governance – Authority, steering and 
democracy, Oxford 2000, p. 21; Arnout Geeraert, Jeroen Scheerder and Hans Bruyninckx, 2013. 
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primarily for that reason. As such, the EU has been able to influence the governance of sport 
at the highest level with consequences for multiple and various actors and sectors at the 
underlying levels. 61  It would certainly be better if other regional organisations could 
contribute to a more global approach in sport, but the reality is that they hardly exist.62  
From a networked governance perspective, the involvement of democratically elected 
politicians in the steering of the sports world has the advantage that a resourceful, collectively 
oriented and democratically committed group is involved in the governance of the sport.63 
Administrators in SGBs cannot be expected to take account of the larger environment, beyond 
their sport, yet at the same time, the rules and regulations they devise and the decisions they 
take often have a significant global socioeconomic impact. According to Sørensen and 
Torfing, the involvement of democratically elected politicians in the steering of a governance 
network also helps to make sure that policy produced by those networks is in line with the 
popular will expressed by the political majority of the elected assemblies.64 That so-called 
‘participatory rhetoric’ is however somewhat problematic in EU policy-making, as the 
distance between the directly affected citizens and their representatives is quite large here.65 
According to Sharpf, majority rule will only be accepted in polities with a ‘thick’ collective 
identity, that is, in polities based on pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture, 
and ethnicity. That is not the case with regard to the EU, although processes of Union-wide 
political communication and opinion formation could eventually arise, facilitated by European 
political parties, European associations, and European media.66 As that is currently not yet the 
case, a more modest form of legitimisation must have to uphold the Union. Sharpf therefore 
introduces the concept of ‘output-oriented legitimacy’, where political choices are legitimate 
if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question: 
‘government for the people’.67 According to Scharpf, output-oriented legitimacy requires no 
more than the perception of a range of common interests that is sufficiently broad and stable 
                                                          
61 E.g. Michele Colucci and Arnout Geeraert: The ‘Social dialogue’ in European professional football, in: 
Comparative labor law and policy journal, 33 (1) (2012), pp. 203-234. 
62 Hans Bruyninckx, 2012. 
63 Ngaire Woods, 1999, p. 45; Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, 2005a, p. 215 
64 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, 2005a, p. 202. 
65 Fritz Scharpf: Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?, Oxford, 1999. 
66 In that regard, the notion of EU citizenship, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, currently primarily is  
a legal concept rather than a political reality.  
67 It must be noted that the democratic quality of Schapf’s notion of ‘output-oriented legitimacy’ seems doubtful, 
since such a legitimacy might just as well be provided by  any dictatorship. 
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to justify institutional arrangements for collective action. Arguably, that is the case with 
regard to professional sports. 
Economic driving forces have transformed the world of professional sports in Europe into a 
complex network with growing interdependence between business interests and the sports 
world, which raises the question whether SGBs can continue to govern unilaterally. Those 
issues indeed call for a constructive collaboration between different authorities, relevant 
stakeholders, industry and sports bodies (multi-actor) at international, national and local level 
(multi-level). In that regard, EU involvement in sport may contribute to more effectiveness. 
For instance, a SGB does not have the capacity to criminalise practices connected to 
transnational criminal activities, which continue to spread due to the commercialisation of 
sport. The EU, in consultation with SGBs, can harmonise its Member States’ approach in 
those issues and thus contribute to the solution for the ‘regulatory overstretch’68 SGBs are 
confronted with. Moreover, the EU can provide knowledge and expertise in certain fields and 
sometimes even an interesting legal framework.69 
The steering of the sports world 
It is very important to stress that we do not advocate a strong interventionist role for the EU. 
According to Sørensen & Torfing, public interference is important and warranted only if and 
when the issue at hand is of ‘great importance to the wider community’.70 Issues such as 
match-fixing or doping are of course of great importance to the wider community in the EU, 
but the EU lacks a strong competence to tackle these. However, from a governance network 
point of view, that is not problematic since governance networks can be most effectively 
controlled through steering.  
According to the governance as steering literature, steering is most effective when ‘hands-off’ 
and ‘hands-on’ forms of steering are combined.71 Hands-off forms of steering, that means, at a 
distance from the self-regulating governance networks, are adequate in the initial phase of the 
steering of the governance network. The term comprises network design and network 
framing. Network design involves the shaping and structuring of governance networks, either 
                                                          
68 Tim Weiss: Governance, good governance and global governance: conceptual and actual challenges, in: Third 
World Quarterly, 21 (5) (2000), p. 808. Mark Zacher: The United Nations and global commerce, New York, 
1999, p. 5;  Klaus Dieter Wolf, 2008, p. 227. 
69 e.g. Michele Colucci and Arnout Geeraert, 2012. 
70 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, 2009, p. 295. 
71 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing, 2009, p. 247. 
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by encouraging the formation of particular forms of networks, or by relying on pre-
established networks. During this process, meta-governors influence inclusion and exclusion 
of certain actors and the empowerment of weaker actors and determine the scope of the 
network.72  Network framing involves the formulation of the political goals and objectives, 
which can be broadly defined, to be pursued by the network and the allocation of resources. 
Sometimes, a legal framework that facilitates and constraints the network may even be drawn. 
Network framing must always be backed by the continuous monitoring and critical evaluation 
of the output of the network.73 
 
Hands-on forms of steering are recommended when the governance network shows signs of 
failure and close interaction between the meta-governors and the governance network is 
needed. That is for instance the case when conflicts arise between network actors, when 
deadlocks occur, when key actors are excluded from the policy deliberations, or when policy 
output stays too far from what is deemed acceptable by the meta-governors.74 The first hands-
on form of steering is network management, which includes attempts by meta-governors to 
reduce tensions through conflict management, promoting favourable conditions and providing 
inputs and resources for joint action, and empowering certain actors.75 The second hands-on 
form is network participation, which requires the participation of the democratically elected 
politicians in the networks. That way, they can get first-hand knowledge of the policy 
processes and exert their political authority in order to influence the network.76 Hands-on 
forms of steering are not only appropriate in the case of governance network failures, as it is 
also quite common in policy areas closely related to the core functions of the state. 77 
However, if the relative autonomy of the network is a key political goal, as is the case with 
sports at the EU level, hands-on forms of meta-governance may be avoided by elected 
politicians and public administrators.  
 
The case of the sectoral social dialogue committee in professional football 
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In this section, we demonstrate how the EU has been able to steer a network of relevant 
football stakeholders towards an agreement that will contribute to the improvement of labour 
conditions for Eastern European football players. As such, we apply the theory advanced in 
the previous sections to a concrete situation and thus unveil the potential of EU steering in 
professional sports. The social dialogue committee in professional football constitutes a prime 
example of an issue-based governance network at the EU level in the field of sport.78 It is 
constructed around an issue that called for multi-level, multi-actor governance as  Union 
Européenne de Football Association (UEFA), the governing body for football at the European 
continent, is unable to deal it with unilaterally, although that was not the basis for starting the 
committee, for which every actor surely had its own reasons.79 The subsequent analysis is 
conducted on the basis of, firstly, a documentary analysis, including official press releases 
from various actors, the memoranda of understanding concluded between UEFA and the 
involved stakeholders, official EU policy documents and relevant academic literature. 
Secondly, four semi-structured hour-long interviews were conducted with senior officials 
from the relevant stakeholders. Three interviewees actually conducted the negotiations on 
behalf of their respective organisations UEFA, ECA and FIFPro. EPFL respectfully declined 
to cooperate.  
  
Background 
In 2001, an agreement on new FIFA rules on international transfers of football players was 
reached between the main football associations FIFA and UEFA on the one side, and the EU 
Commissioners in charge of competition, sport and social affairs on the other side.80 These 
new regulations replaced the old transfer rules, which had to be abolished as a consequence of 
the Bosman ruling, in which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that 
prohibiting out-of-contract players to move to a different club and the 3+2 rule, a quota 
system allowing only three foreign players on a team in a national league, plus two other 
                                                          
78 True, since the outcome of the social dialogue is an industrial relations' agreement, where the EU has played a 
facilitating role in the sense of (neo)corporatist interest intermediation (Philippe Schmitter: Still the century of 
corporatism?, in: Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds), Trends towards Corporatism Intermediation,  
London 1979, 7–49), we cannot speak of a public policy in the very basic sense of ‘everything a government 
decides to do or not to do’ (Thomas Dye: Understanding Public Policy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the social dialogue committee in professional football therefore may not qualify as a 
governance network in the generic sense does not preclude the relevance of the use of concepts such as 
governance as networks or governance as steering, as we will demonstrate.  
79 See Michele Colucci and Arnout Geeraert, 2012. 
80 Letter from Mario Monti to Joseph S. Blatter, D/000258, 5 March 2001. 
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foreigners if they played for 5 years without a break in the host country, was a violation of EU 
law. Recognising that social dialogue could be an effective method to find common solutions 
on employment matters between clubs and players, the Commission invited the global 
governing body for football, FIFA, and UEFA to encourage clubs to start or pursue social 
dialogue with the representative bodies of football players and thereunto, they offered the 
Commission's assistance. Ever since, the Commission has been supporting projects for the 
consolidation of social dialogue in sports in general and in football in particular. 
In July 2008, following the signing of the Rules of Procedure by the participating parties, the 
European Union Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the Professional Football sector 
(SDCPF) was established. Professional football is the first sport where social dialogue, a 
means to conclude agreements and to foster cooperation between employers and employees, 
has been set up at the EU level, paving the way for other sports. The committee brings 
together UEFA and the European representative organisations for football leagues (European 
Professional Football Leagues - EPFL), clubs (European Club Association - ECA) and players 
(Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels - FIFPro). In April 
2012, the relevant internal bodies of the involved organisations ratified an agreement on 
minimum requirements for standard football players contracts.   
The steering of the network 
The European Commission has been very involved in the network design of the SDCPF. It 
had been encouraging the formation of a social dialogue committee in professional football 
since the conclusion of the 2001 agreement on new FIFA transfer rules and it had been 
supporting projects for the consolidation of social dialogue in football in particular. In 
addition, the Commission provided important resources to the SDCPF actors. According to all 
interviewees, indirect financial support through, for instance, the reimbursement of travel 
expenses by the Commission is particularly important to FIFPro, whose budget is far more 
limited than those of the other participating organisations. In that way, the Commission also 
contributes to the empowerment of stakeholders and makes sure that actors are brought 
together ‘in a room’, where they are obliged to dialogue. According to the interviewees, the 
Commission did not extensively try to regulate the network, limiting itself to bringing the 
parties in the SDCPF together and providing guidance with regard to EU law and social 
dialogue in general. That seems to resonate with the Commission’s role under article 154 (1) 
TFEU, which limits its task to taking ‘any relevant measure to facilitate social dialogue by 
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ensuring balancing support for the parties’. When the SDCPF had reached an impasse in early 
2011, the Commission tried to reconcile differences, for instance by organising bilateral 
negotiations with the individual parties81 and eventually drafted a compromise agreement 
‘which would eventually serve as the basis for the final agreement’.82 
 
The Commission’s legitimacy to interfere in football is confined by limited competence but it 
can exercise some form of indirect pressure to come to a solution. At a certain point, the 
negotiations in the committee were deadlocked. Had this not been resolved, it would 
eventually have ended in the refusal from the Commission to renew the committee’s budget 
and consequently the death of the committee (Interview: stakeholder official, September 
2012).83 That could entail high political costs for the participating parties, since ‘it is very 
important to have good relations with the EU’.84 
 
A more effective governance of football 
Recently, FIFPro has reported about the many abuses in Eastern Europe regarding players’ 
contracts such as the absence of any guarantee in case of illness and/or injuries, penalties from 
10% to 100% of salary and bonuses unilaterally determined by the club management, etc.85 
The adoption of minimum requirements in standard players’ contracts at European Union 
level thus becomes very important in order to better define the duties and obligations of the 
contractual parties.  
Minimum requirements must be implemented at the national level in collective bargaining 
agreements between leagues and representative organisations for players and cannot be 
imposed by UEFA unilaterally, given its limited regulatory powers over national football. 
According to one interviewee, UEFA progressively realised that social dialogue is needed in 
order to make progress in football 86  and that it needed help from football’s stakeholder 
organisations. Thus, stakeholder organisations such as FIFPro, EPFL and ECA are needed 
since they can facilitate the implementation at the national level by their member base.  
                                                          
81 Stakeholder Official, in discussion with the author, September 2012. 
82 Stakeholder Official, in discussion with the author, August 2012. 
83 Stakeholder Official, in discussion with the author, September 2012. 
84 Stakeholder Official, in discussion with the author, August 2012. 
85 FIFPro: FIFPro black book Eastern Europe, Hoofddorp, 2012. 
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The European Commission has a good knowledge of the football sector and its stakeholders, 
but most importantly, a great expertise in the area of social dialogue. 87  UEFA and the 
stakeholders thus can benefit from the latter. In addition, the EU legal framework for social 
dialogue is very helpful and ‘provides an interesting platform for the conclusion of European 
agreements’.88 One interviewee stressed that the Commission does well in providing guidance 
to the stakeholders on social bargaining agreements and what is possible in the SDCPF with 
regard to EU law, strikingly describing the Commission’s role as ‘the guardian of the 
treaties’, hence referring to its legal role under Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union.89 
In the end, the Commission was able to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on minimum 
requirements for standard football player contracts, which will have to be implemented at the 
national level in the relevant countries and then may constitute a first step towards solutions to 
the abuses in Eastern Europe regarding players’ contracts.  
Better governance in football through enhanced democracy 
The interweaving of theoretical discussions of how to define democracy and the political 
discussions of how to institutionalise democratic forms of governance in the present societies 
means that democratic procedures are in fact subject to endless political contestations and 
therefore, it is extremely difficult to draw up a complete or unbiased list of democratic 
procedures.90 However, there are certain general rules and norms inherent to a democratic 
grammar of conduct 91 , such as such as participation. 92  In that regard, in a governance 
network, none of the affected stakeholders must be marginalised in a way that systematically 
prevents them from influencing policy.93 
 
UEFA formally has as an objective that it ensures that the needs of the different stakeholders 
in European football are properly taken into account. Nevertheless, clubs have considerably 
more control over UEFA than players. Indeed, at the end of the 1990s, UEFA realised that 
clubs, as opposed players, have –and considered- the option of ‘exit’, when a group of elite 
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European clubs threatened to establish a European Super League outside of its structures. 
According to Hirschmann, exit is a viable solution as long as there are outside options 
available and this certainly goes for the richest and biggest clubs, since they can rely on their 
reputation and the quality of their players to attract a large audience in their own competition. 
Other clubs do not have the necessary means and are more ‘loyal’ to UEFA, mostly due to the 
historic appearance of UEFA’s competitions 94  and the lack of a viable exit solution. In 
addition, UEFA’s statutes stipulate that every Executive Committee member, except the 
UEFA president, has to hold office in a national federation 95  and the latter are highly 
receptive to clubs’ concerns. 96  ECA’s powerful position in the governance of European 
football is underscored by current UEFA president Michel Platini himself, who states ‘'I don't 
want to have a big fight with the clubs like in the past. We can do nothing without permission 
of the clubs’.97 Finally, the fact that UEFA, ECA and EPFL all reside in the same Swiss 
municipality, while FIFPro has its main office near Amsterdam in the Netherlands should also 
not be underestimated. Officials from the former three organisations meet on a regular basis, 
formally, but also informally, during lunches and social events. Moreover, while the more 
regular contact between FIFPro officials and UEFA is a relatively recent phenomenon, UEFA 
has a tradition of dealing with clubs and never directly with players. 
Hence, clubs have managed to obtain important concessions from UEFA. For instance, they 
take a majority of the seats in UEFA’s Club Competitions Committee, which among others 
draws up recommendations and exchanges views regarding possible modifications to the 
existing UEFA club competitions and to the regulations governing these competitions.98 
Furthermore, the recently renewed memorandum of understanding between ECA and UEFA 
includes arrangements on an increase of the agreed amount to be distributed to clubs for 
giving their players away to national teams; an insurance covering the risk of injury while on 
international team duty; and the international match calendar.99 
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95 UEFA Statutes 2012, article 21.3. 
96 Stakeholder Official, in discussion with the author, July 2013 
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FIFPro’s participation in the social dialogue has definitely enforced its representativeness and 
legitimacy and has hence enhanced its position in the governance of European football, 
making it a stronger stakeholder with whom the other stakeholders are now forced to be 
reckoned with. In addition, by providing expertise and indirect financial support through, for 
instance, the reimbursement of travel expenses, the Commission further contributed to the 
empowerment of FIFPro. Finally, by making sure that actors are brought together ‘in a room’, 
where they are obliged to dialogue, the Commission made sure that FIFPro was able to 
influence the decisions made by the governance network.100 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to explore the added value of a theory-of-governance approach to 
professional sports, focusing on both sports in general and the EU’s involvement therein. As 
summarised by figure 1, this approach has added value for both focuses. First, regarding the 
sport world in general, we found that a shift from hierarchical self-governance to networked 
governance is taking place in sports. That may lead to more effective governance, since 
networked governance is better suited for managing an increasingly complex sports world. 
This shift also entails a potential danger in terms of democratic performance, since 
stakeholders who lack clout may be marginalised in a way that systematically prevents them 
from influencing policy in a governance network. SGBs are willing to engage in networked 
governance arrangements with political institutions in order to get legitimacy and because 
they can mitigate political control by means of proactive lobbying. With regard to governance 
as steering, SGBs do not want to be steered by public authorities and they benefit from the 
lack of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’, i.e. the threat that networked governance may be replaced by 
hierarchical rule, and the means of reprisal they have at their disposal. Finally, when we focus 
on the sports governance through a normative lens, we find that the large autonomy of 
GSGBs has resulted in a low quality of self-governance and the lack of accountability 
arrangements within these organisations precludes the impetus for change from within. 
Secondly, we applied the three dimensions of governance to the issue of EU involvement in 
professional sports. From a networked governance perspective, we established that EU 
involvement may lead to a more effective sports governance due to its expertise and its 
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harmonising capacities. Indeed, whereas SGBs are often faced with a regulatory overstretch 
when trying to tackle certain governance issues that emerge in an increasingly complex sports 
world, the EU can provide a framework for intervention. We also established that the EU has 
a certain capacity to steer sports since, whereas SGBs are reluctant to be steered by national 
public authorities, they believe the opinions and concerns of the EU matter. In that regard, EU 
steering may lead to more democracy, for instance through the empowerment of marginalised, 
but nevertheless relevant stakeholders.  
Figure 1. The outcomes of a theory-of-governance approach towards the sports world and the issue of EU 
intervention in professional sports 
 Sports world Added value of EU involvement 
in sports 
Governance as networks - Shift from hierarchical self-
governance to networked 
governance 
- SGBs are willing to engage in 
networked governance 
arrangements with political 
institutions for pragmatic reasons 
- Networked governance (as 
opposed to ‘government’) in sports 
may lead to increased effectiveness  
- Danger exists that the most 
powerful stakeholders are favoured 
by SGBs 
- The involvement of the EU may 
lead to a more effective sports 
governance due to its expertise and 
its harmonising capacities 
Governance as steering - Steering of GSGBs by public 
authorities is complicated by the 
lack of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and 
the means of reprisal available to 
these organisations   
- The EU has the capacity to steer 
sport, taking into account the public 
interest 
Good governance - The large autonomy of GSGBs 
has resulted in a low quality of self-
governance 
- EU involvement in sport may lead 
to more democracy  
  
On a concluding note, it is clear that interesting new avenues for research emerge from this 
chapter. Most notably, the steering role of the EU in professional sports deserves more 
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attention. In order to come to a better understanding of this role and its conditions for success, 
there is a need to move beyond description and further analyse the relationships between the 
involved actors, lifting it from mere description to solid analysis. Thus, future research could 
unpack the governance box and theoretically underpin those relationships. Seen from that 
angle, governance literature is a valuable stepping-stone towards an in-depth theoretical 
analysis of the limits and opportunities of the role of the EU in achieving better governance in 
professional sports. In any case, it is clear that the governance turn in professional sports is an 
irreversible evolution. Indeed, the time when SGBs unilaterally controlled sports definitively 
belongs to the past. 
